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BANK LIABILITY UNDER THE
ANTITERRORISM ACT: THE MENTAL STATE
REQUIREMENT UNDER § 2333(a)
Olivia G. Chalos*
Terrorism is at the forefront of international concern. The United States
devotes tremendous resources to disrupt terrorist networks, but the fight
against terrorism continues to involve countless fronts. Since September
11, 2001, financial institutions have emerged as an increasingly popular
target in efforts to cut off the flow of material support to terrorist
organizations abroad. Civil claims continue to be filed against banks, in
part because of their “deep pockets.” These claims generally allege that
the banks provided material support to terrorist groups through the
provision of financial services.
The potential for large civil judgments against banks under the
Antiterrorism Act (ATA), however, remains problematic in practice.
Inconsistency in the interpretation and application of ATA civil liability
limits the statute’s effectiveness. It encourages forum shopping and creates
the potential for disparate judgments depending on the court where an
action is filed.
This Note specifically addresses the jurisdictional split on the mental
state requirement necessary to hold a defendant liable under the ATA. This
Note explores the current judicial interpretations of the statute and
concludes that, as the statute stands, the Second Circuit best interprets the
mental state requirement for § 2333(a) claims predicated on a violation of
material support laws. This Note proposes, however, that Congress should
amend the ATA to clarify the state-of-mind requirement and should only
allow for a cause of action where a bank manifests heightened culpability
through intentional wrongdoing in the provision of financial services to
foreign terrorist organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, August 2, 2005, on a central street in downtown Basra, a
group of men, dressed in police uniforms and driving a police sedan,
kidnapped Steven C. Vincent, a freelance writer and blogger, and his
interpreter and close friend, Nooriya Tuaiz.1 Later that day, Vincent’s body
was found three miles north of the city center.2 He had been shot three
times in the chest and his hands were tied together with plastic wire.3 There
were bruises on his face and right shoulder.4 Tuaiz, also shot, narrowly
survived the attack.5 Just three days earlier, the New York Times had

1. Edward Wong, U.S. Journalist Who Wrote About Police Corruption Is Abducted and
Killed in Basra, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/world/
middleeast/us-journalist-who-wrote-about-police-corruption-is.html [https://perma.cc/QJJ8J7WP].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Anthony Ramirez, Slain Reporter Is Recalled as Intrepid on Art or War, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 4, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/nyregion/slain-reporter-is-recalled-asintrepid-on-art-or-war.html [https://perma.cc/2E5Z-7JZ4].
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published Vincent’s op-ed article, “Switched Off in Basra,” exposing
Iranian infiltration of the police force in Southern Iraq.6
Vincent was the first journalist killed in the Iraq War.7 He is, however,
one of the thousands of people killed by acts of terrorism in the last decade,
and now his wife is one of hundreds of people seeking civil redress in U.S.
courts.8 In November 2014, Vincent’s widow, along with other relatives of
American soldiers and civilians injured or killed by Iranian-backed terrorist
groups, filed suit in the Eastern District of New York.9 The case, Freeman
v. HSBC Holdings PLC,10 is named for the lead plaintiff, Charlotte
Freeman, whose husband Brian, an Army captain, died in a militant attack
in Karbala, Iraq, in 2007.11 The complaint does not target the terrorists
responsible for the attacks but instead names five of the largest banks in the
world: Barclays, HSBC Holdings, Standard Chartered, Credit Suisse Group
AG, and Royal Bank of Scotland NV.12 The plaintiffs allege, among other
claims, that the banks committed acts of international terrorism by
supporting terrorist groups through the provision of financial services.13
The Freeman case represents a growing trend in civil claims brought
against banks and other secondary actors under the Antiterrorism Act
(ATA).14 In the wake of terrorist attacks, victims and their families are
often left with a troubling reality: they have little chance of hailing those
directly responsible into court. Civil liability for those who provide
material support to terrorist groups is therefore thought to serve several
purposes: (1) it allows victims and their families to hold anyone in the
chain of causation directly accountable,15 (2) it allows for potentially

6. Id.; see also Steven Vincent, Switched Off in Basra, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/opinion/switched-off-in-basra.html [https://perma.cc/
6SVB-3YBK].
7. See Wong, supra note 1.
8. See Paul Barrett, The Big Bet to Hold Banks Liable for Terrorism, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-19/arecredit-suisse-rbs-standard-chartered-hsbc-and-barclays-terrorist-banks- [https://perma.cc/4B
MR-VRUQ].
9. Id.
10. No. 14-CV-06601 (E.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 10, 2014).
11. Barrett, supra note 8.
12. See Amended Complaint at 5, Freeman, No. 14-CV-06601 (Apr. 2, 2015), ECF No.
77.
13. See id.
14. In the last decade, ATA cases also have been brought against oil companies, food
distribution companies, and other major corporations. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, ANTITERRORISM ACT LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2014), https://
www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_AntiTerrorism_Act_Liability_for
_Financial_Institutions_09242014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMY2-AXTL]; see also, e.g., In re
Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d
1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (bringing ATA claims against Chiquita, a banana company, alleging
that it paid and provided weapons and ammunition to Colombian paramilitary and guerilla
groups to gain competitive advantage over other banana growers).
15. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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significant financial recourse,16 and (3) it encourages banks to “think twice”
about their role in terrorism’s causal chain.17
Financial institutions therefore remain a major target in efforts to prevent
and combat terrorist financing and support.18 In general, there are three
types of cases brought against banks under the ATA19: (1) financial
services that directly benefit terrorist organizations, including the provision
of nonroutine bank services on behalf of the terrorist group;20 (2) routine
financial services with terrorist organizations, such as transactions done
predominantly by computers;21 and (3) violations of laws regarding
financial transactions with states sponsoring terrorism.22
The majority of claims against banks are brought in federal court in New
York. A number of courts, however, remain divided over the scope of the
ATA and how to apply it in banking cases.23 There are two primary issues
with the statute’s application24: (1) The ATA does not explicitly provide
for aiding and abetting liability and (2) § 2333(a) does not include a stateof-mind requirement.25 As to the first issue, which is beyond the scope of
16. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir.
2002) (discussing how banks provide a good alternative for civil recourse because few
terrorist organizations are likely to have cash assets or property located in the United States
that could be used to fulfill a civil judgment). This Note refers to the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in 2002, which held that § 2333(a) permits a secondary cause of liability, as Boim I.
In 2007, the Seventh Circuit took up the issue again in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for
Relief & Development (Boim II), 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit then
reviewed and vacated the Boim II decision en banc in 2008, holding against secondary
liability. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 705 (7th
Cir. 2008) (en banc).
17. See generally Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014).
18. Terrorist financing refers to the act of knowingly providing something of value to
persons and groups engaged in terrorist activity. See Jeffrey Breinholt, The Revolution of
Substantive Criminal Counterterrorism Law: “Material Support” and Its Philosophical
Underpinnings, in THE LAW OF COUNTERTERRORISM 91, 98 (Lynne K. Zusman ed., 2011).
19. VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, ATA Banking Cases, in 2 LITIGATION OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:43 (2005).
20. Id.; see also Linde, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
21. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 19.
22. Id.; see also Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013).
23. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2014); Boim
v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 705 (7th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
24. The ATA has been criticized on these two bases as being an ineffective remedy for
victims of terrorism and “little more than a pyrrhic or moral victory against the perpetrators
of acts of international terrorism.” Jimmy Gurulé, Holding Banks Liable Under the AntiTerrorism Act for Providing Financial Services to Terrorists: An Ineffective Legal Remedy
in Need of Reform, 41 J. LEGIS. 184, 185, 219 (2015).
25. See id. at 206. The Second and Seventh Circuits do not recognize secondary
liability. The courts rely on the analysis of Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181–82 (1994), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 does not permit a private cause of
action on an aiding and abetting theory unless explicitly written into the statute. See Weiss v.
Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Boim III,
549 F.3d at 691. To find liability in jurisdictions that recognize aiding and abetting liability,
the provision of financial services by the bank must have “substantially assist[ed]” the
principal violation. Plaintiffs do not have to prove that the bank’s provision of financial
services was the proximate cause of the attack. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 185–86; see Wultz
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this Note, banks are not the direct actors carrying out the attack—the
terrorists are. The question is: How far removed from a violent act can an
action be to still be an activity “involved” in that act?26 Courts are deeply
divided over whether the ATA allows for secondary liability on the theory
that a bank aided or abetted the acts of terrorism.27
This Note specifically addresses the second issue: The disagreement
over the mental state requirement for claims brought under the ATA. This
Note analyzes primary liability in private suits against banks for alleged
violations of the material support and terrorist financing statutes,28
specifically focusing on the different standards applied by the Second and
Seventh Circuits. Neither circuit recognizes aiding and abetting liability
under the ATA.29 The courts, however, disagree on the requisite level of
fault to establish civil liability under § 2333(a) and whether a claim under
§ 2333(a) requires deliberate wrongdoing on the part of the bank.30 The
ATA is silent on this issue.
For example, in the Seventh Circuit, a victim must demonstrate that a
bank violated an underlying criminal offense and engaged in deliberate
wrongdoing.31 Deliberate wrongdoing may be satisfied by criminal
recklessness.32 This places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to prove that the
bank knew, or was “substantially certain,” that the provision of financial
services would be used to commit an act of terrorism.33
In the Second Circuit, however, a bank may be liable under the ATA if it
provides financial services with the knowledge that the customer or
beneficiary engages in acts of terrorism.34 A plaintiff must only show that a
bank violated a criminal offense, for example, by knowing or being
deliberately indifferent to the fact that its customer was collecting money

v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 57 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Halberstam v.
Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
26. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
27. The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) is currently before
Congress. If enacted, the bill would explicitly allow secondary liability under the ATA. It
would amend § 2333 by adding: “In an action arising under subsection (a), liability may be
asserted as to the person or persons who committed such act of international terrorism or any
person or entity that aided, abetted, or conspired with the person or persons who committed
such an act of international terrorism.” See H.R. REP. NO. 113-3143, at 7 (2013).
28. Liability is found, through statutory incorporation, for secondary actors who are
primarily liable for providing material support in violation of a criminal law. See Boim III,
549 F.3d at 691.
29. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2013) (dismissing aiding and
abetting claims under the ATA); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Rothstein to dismiss conspiracy-based claims under the ATA on
the basis that the ATA does not provide for secondary liability). The Second Circuit
recognized secondary liability prior to 2012. See Alison Bitterly, Note, Can Banks Be Liable
for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?: A Closer Look into the Split on Secondary Liability
Under the Antiterrorism Act, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3398 (2015).
30. See Gurulé, supra note 24, at 186, 219.
31. Id. at 219.
32. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 693.
33. See id.
34. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2014).
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for a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).35 The bank does not need to
engage in additional “deliberate wrongdoing,” and plaintiffs do not need to
demonstrate that the defendant knew, intended, or recklessly disregarded
that the funds likely would be used to finance a terrorist attack.36
Despite the potential benefits of ATA claims, the current framework
creates inconsistent and disparate civil judgments. It incentivizes filing in
particular courts based on varying theories of liability and culpability
requirements. The disagreement among courts is problematic. Although a
jury held a bank liable under the ATA for the first time in September
2014,37 the current application of the statute casts doubts on whether it will
be an effective, or merely symbolic, means of future recourse for victims of
terrorism. Moreover, the current use of the statute also threatens to create
expansive and potentially destructive liability for banks and other secondary
actors.
Part I of this Note presents background on the ATA’s legislative history
and statutory language. Part I also summarizes the material support and
terrorist financing laws and their statutory incorporation into § 2333(a)
claims against banks. Next, Part II explores the conflict over whether the
ATA requires a mental state beyond that of the underlying predicate offense
of international terrorism. It also addresses the implications of current
judicial interpretations of the statute. Then, Part III argues that the law, in
its current form, supports the Second Circuit’s analysis of the ATA’s stateof-mind requirement. It also explores the interpretive infirmities of primary
liability under the ATA and proposes that Congress should amend the
statute.
Congress should clarify the state-of-mind requirement for
§ 2333(a) primary liability and should allow for a cause of action only
where a bank manifests heightened culpability through intentional
wrongdoing in the provision of financial services to FTOs.
I. BACKGROUND
This part discusses the ATA’s development and the relevant statutory
provisions. It also discusses the material support and terrorist financing
statutes, which generally serve as the predicate offenses for ATA claims
against banks.
A. ATA Legislative History
The Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), provides a private right of
action to any U.S. national “injured in his or her person, property, or

35. See id. at 206–09.
36. See id.
37. See Verdict Form, Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(No. 04-cv-2799), 2014 WL 4913320. The case was settled for an undisclosed amount three
days before the damages trial was set to begin. See Stephanie Clifford, Arab Bank Reaches
Settlement in Suit Accusing It of Financing Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/nyregion/arab-bank-reaches-settlement-in-suit-accusing-itof-financing-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/NB7H-AX99].
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business by reason of[38] an act of international terrorism.”39 The statute
was enacted, among other reasons, to complement existing criminal
sanctions by creating a private cause of action for victims of terrorism.40 In
passing the ATA, Congress envisioned a statute whose scope would extend
beyond terrorists and allow for liability at numerous points in the causal
chain.41
The first Antiterrorism Act was enacted in 1987 in direct response to the
1985 murder of Leon Klinghoffer, a U.S. citizen.42 On October 7, 1985,
members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacked the
Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise ship, shot Klinghoffer, and dumped his
body into the Mediterranean Sea.43 Klinghoffer’s family brought suit
against the PLO claiming that the murder was an act of international
terrorism perpetrated by a terrorist organization.44 The District Court for
the Southern District of New York exercised jurisdiction over the PLO
because the crime took place in international waters and therefore fell under
federal admiralty jurisdiction and the Death on the High Seas Act.45 Had
Klinghoffer’s murder occurred within a foreign state instead of navigable
waters, a court likely would not have upheld jurisdiction.46 The
Klinghoffer case illustrated a jurisdictional gap in efforts to develop a
comprehensive legal response to international terrorism.47 To fill the gap,
Congress drafted the ATA and established a civil cause of action for
victims of terrorism.
Congress enacted the second Antiterrorism Act in 1990.48 It created
several terrorism-related provisions, including the ATA’s civil provision
and the definition of international terrorism currently in effect.49 Sections
2333–2338 (excluding §§ 2332a–2332h) provide U.S. nationals with civil
38. Many courts interpret the “by reason of” requirement to be the same as the
requirement in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961–1968 (2012). See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011
(7th Cir. 2002) (“The Supreme Court has interpreted identical language [in the RICO statute]
to require a showing of proximate cause.”); see also Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503
U.S. 258, 265–68 (1992) (holding that in civil RICO cases, “by reason of” requires a
showing that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
40. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to punish crimes against the law
of nations and to carry out the treaty obligations of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 10; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214.
41. Stephen I. Landman, Bank Liability Under the Anti-Terrorism Act: Dispelling the
“Routine Banking Services” Defense in Material Support Cases 19 (Dec. 9, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314104
[https://perma.cc/JX76-PWB2].
42. Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1001–1005, 101 Stat. 1406, 1406–07 (1987).
43. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
vacated, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 859.
46. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
47. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3398.
48. Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2240, 2250.
49. See id. § 132, 104 Stat. at 2250–51; Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3397.
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remedies for acts of international terrorism, the district courts with
jurisdiction, and a statute of limitations period for civil claims.50
In 1991, the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 was repealed for technical
reasons.51 In 1992, the substantive provisions of the ATA of 1990 were
enacted again.52 By imposing “liability at any point along the causal chain
of terrorism,” Congress sought to “interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of
money” to terrorist organizations.53 It designed the ATA to “allow victims
to
pursue
renegade
terrorist
organizations,
their
leaders,
and . . . resources”54 and hold them “accountable where it hurts them most:
at their lifeline, their funds.”55
B. ATA Claims Against Banks
Under § 2333(a), any U.S. national (or an estate, survivor, or heir) may
sue for an injury sustained by an act of international terrorism for treble
damages56 and attorney’s fees.57 The ATA, however, contains several
limitations: (1) it provides a cause of action only for U.S. nationals; (2) it
bars civil actions against state sponsors of terrorism and codifies the act of
state doctrine by barring claims arising from official acts of foreign
governments;58 (3) it prohibits civil actions for injury or loss suffered by
reason of “an act of war”;59 and (4) the Attorney General may stay any civil
50. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
Effective January 2, 2013, Congress passed an amendment to the ATA extending the statute
of limitations from four to ten years. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2335
(2012)).
51. See Pub. L. No. 102-27, § 402, 105 Stat. 130, 155 (1991), amended by Military
Construction Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 102-136, § 126, 105 Stat. 637, 643 (1991).
52. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 1003, 106
Stat. 4506, 4521–24; Almog, 471 F. Supp. at 266. The terrorism-related provisions are
codified at §§ 2331–2338 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Sections 2332a–2332h and §§ 2339–
2339D were enacted by other laws, including the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
53. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002).
54. 138 CONG. REC. S17,254 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
55. 136 CONG. REC. S14,284 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
56. “Damages that, by statute, are three times the amount of actual damages that the
fact-finder determines is owed.” Treble Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). The first successful terrorism case under the ATA
was Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005). It resulted in
a $116 million judgment against the PLO and Palestinian Authority on behalf of the family
of an American citizen murdered by terrorists in Israel. See id. at 276, 279.
58. Section 2337(2) does not allow suits against a “foreign state, an agency of a foreign
state, or an officer or employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his or
her official capacity or under color of legal authority.” 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2). For a critique of
sovereign immunity in civil claims against state sponsors of terror, see John Norton Moore,
Civil Litigation Against Terrorism: Neglected Promise, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST TERROR (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2010).
59. “[C]ourts have consistently construed . . . ‘act of war’ to exclude deliberate attacks
against innocent civilians.” Gurulé, supra note 24, at 189; see also Sokolow v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 583 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that targeting civilians
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action brought under § 2333, or limit or stop discovery if the action would
interfere with criminal prosecution or a national security operation.60
ATA liability occurs through an intricate series of statutory
incorporations.61 Courts describe claims brought under the ATA as “akin
to a Russian matryoshka doll, with statutes nested inside of statutes.”62 To
sustain a § 2333(a) claim, plaintiffs must prove three formal elements: (1)
the defendant must commit an “act of international terrorism,” (2) the
defendant must act with the mens rea required to prove a predicate act
qualifying as international terrorism, and (3) the injury of a U.S. national
must be “by reason of”63 a crime that constitutes an act of international
terrorism.64
“International terrorism”65 is defined by § 2331(1) to mean activities that
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended[66]—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

outside of a combat or military zone did “not constitute acts of war for purposes of the
ATA”); Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that
an attack on a public bus in Israel was not committed “in the course of” armed conflict and
thus did not come within “act of war” exception to liability under the ATA).
60. See Gurulé, supra note 24, at 189.
61. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2014).
62. Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Schwab
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008)).
63. Courts have interpreted the proximate cause requirement differently. Compare
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (requiring plaintiffs asserting ATA
civil claims to plausibly allege proximate cause and affirming dismissal of ATA claims
against a European bank), and Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265–68
(1992) (requiring proximate cause for plaintiff to recover under treble damages provision of
RICO, that is, a direct relation between conduct alleged and injury asserted), with Wultz v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 57 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring “a causal
connection” between the injury and the conduct complained of which occurs where the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant).
64. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Gurulé, supra
note 24, at 189. Some courts have phrased the requisite elements as (1) unlawful action, (2)
the requisite mental state, and (3) causation. See, e.g., Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
65. This definition is the same as the definition of “international terrorism” provided in
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012)).
66. The Seventh Circuit has issued several decisions in the Boim line of cases that
establish a different standard from the Second Circuit, including “foreseeability” as the
dispositive factor in proving whether acts “appear to be intended” for a terrorist purpose.
Gurulé, supra note 24, at 193–94. If it were foreseeable that the provision of material
support would facilitate a terrorist attack, then such contribution would “appear to be
intended” for a terrorist-related purpose. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim
III), 549 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (stating that the “appear to be intended”
requirement “is not a state-of-mind requirement; it is a matter of external appearance rather
than subjective intent”).
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(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.67

C. Material Support Statutes
To satisfy the “act of international terrorism” requirement, a defendant
first must violate a predicate criminal offense.68 The material support69 and
terrorist financing statutes, §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C, generally serve
as the predicate criminal offenses for ATA claims against banks.70 The
statutes prohibit the provision of material support or financing to terrorist
organizations and provide for punishments including the imposition of large
fines and imprisonment.71 Courts have construed violations of the material
support statutes as “acts dangerous to human life”72 that satisfy the “appear
to be intended” and transnational components of “international terrorism”
for § 2333(a) purposes.73
The material support statutes are doctrinally innovative.74 Unlike
traditional criminal complicity, which involves phrases such as aid or abet,

67. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (emphasis added). Courts hold that the ATA applies to
transnational acts of terrorism. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C)).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A); Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (“Pleading and proving the
violation of a predicate criminal provision is required to satisfy the first requirement of an
ATA claim, [a] violation of a federal or state criminal law.”). There is criticism over
congressional intent to incorporate crimes—for example, the material support statutes—into
the civil provision of the ATA. The material support laws were passed half a decade after
the ATA. See Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the Civil Suit
Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 559 (2013).
69. Robert M. Chesney notes that the “material support law is one part of a matrix of
terrorism-support laws” that have accrued from government efforts to put a stop to persons
providing support, well-intentioned or otherwise, to FTOs. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper
Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 4
(2005).
70. To fully satisfy the international terrorism requirement, a defendant’s acts must also
meet the “appear to be intended” requirements and contain a transnational component. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Gurulé, supra note 24, at 190.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
72. The “appear to be intended” requirement has generated some controversy. See
Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3428 (explaining that the “appear to be intended” requirement is
often overlooked and is inconsistent with the general understanding of primary liability
under the ATA).
73. See Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. 06-CV-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (“Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and § 2339C are recognized
as international terrorism under 18 U.S.C. [§] 2333(a).”); accord Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,
384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
74. See NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 113 (2d ed.
2005). The material support laws are different from traditional forms of complicity liability;
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material support is defined by listing categories of prohibited conduct.75
The material support laws fit squarely within the U.S. counterterrorism
tradition for this reason.76 They are strategically overinclusive;77 crimes are
based on how terrorists behave, even if they reach conduct, such as the
donation of funds, that is not overtly dangerous.78
“Material support” is defined broadly by the statutes and typically
includes the provision of financial services.79 Some courts hold that the
materiality requirement is fulfilled by “routine” banking services including
opening and maintaining bank accounts, collecting funds, transmitting
funds, and providing credit card services.80 Banks often challenge liability
on the basis that they provided only “routine banking services.”81 A
number of courts reject this argument, however, explaining that even the
provision of “routine banking services,” when knowingly provided to a
terrorist, subjects a bank to liability.82
The first material support law was codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A
following the 1993 World Trade Center Bombings.83 The new enforcement
paradigm specifically focused on terrorist financing.84 Section 2339A
prohibits the provision of “material support or resources . . . knowing or
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a
violation” of one or more of enumerated predicate offenses.85 The
proscribed offenses include crimes typically associated with terrorism,
including those involving aircrafts and airports; arson; chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons; murder; explosives; hostage taking; and damage to

the provision of material support is itself an independent substantive offense, with its own
penalty, rather than a form of secondary liability to a substantive offense. Id.
75. Id.
76. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 99.
77. The overinclusiveness has been challenged as unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g.,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18 (2010).
78. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 99. The Constitution recognizes certain financial
transactions as protected by the First Amendment and guaranteed freedoms of speech and
association. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b), 2339B(g)(4) (2012).
80. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 624 (E.D.N.Y.
2006). Some courts have declined to hold banks liable for injuries following routine banking
services, holding that the link between the bank and the injury was too tenuous to afford
relief. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 833
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
81. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 832; see also Linde v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting the bank’s attempt to
escape liability on the theory that it provided only routine services, and finding that the
bank’s provision of services exceeded what could reasonably be considered “routine”).
82. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 100, 118 (E.D.N.Y.
2013), vacated and remanded, 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014); see also infra Part I.J.2.
83. Bitterly, supra note 29, at 400; see also Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A).
84. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 98. Before, enforcement for similar conduct could be
accomplished only through money-laundering prosecutions. Id. at 99.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
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U.S. property, communication systems, and energy facilities.86 Section
2339A only criminalizes acts in which there is intent for the material
support to be used in acts of terrorism or operations.87
In early practice, § 2339A proved difficult to enforce.88 In the years
immediately following September 11, 2001, cases involving charities
dominated terrorist financing prosecutions.89 Under § 2339A, a person
easily could avoid liability by showing that he or she thought the money
would be spent on benign activities.90 The law largely was ineffective for
two reasons: (1) terrorist organizations often engage in legitimate
philanthropic and humanitarian efforts91 and (2) successful prosecution
required tracing donor funds to a particular act of terrorism, a “practical
impossibility.”92 Nevertheless, there has been an increase in recent cases
charging this offense.93
In 1996, Congress enacted § 2339B, the most frequently charged terrorist
financing crime, to expand the effective scope of the material support law.94
Section 2339B was signed into law as part of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in response to the Oklahoma City
bombing.95 It did not become fully operational until the Secretary of State
issued the first list of Designated FTOs on October 7, 1997.96
Section 2339B prohibits “knowingly provid[ing] material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”97 To violate the provision, a
person must act with “knowledge that the organization is a designated
foreign terrorist organization . . . that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorist activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorism.”98 “Engages in terrorist activity” is defined to include
“solicit[ing] funds or other things of value for . . . a terrorist organization
described in clause (vi)(I)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act.99
86. Michael Taxay, Larry Schneider & Katherine Didow, What to Charge in a Terrorist
Financing or Facilitation Case, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., Sept. 2014, at 9, 10.
87. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3400; see also Chesney, supra note 69, at 13 n.73.
88. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002) (an
early ATA case brought alleging § 2339A claims).
89. See, e.g., id.
90. The statute also did not allow for investigations based on “activities protected by the
First Amendment, including expressions of support or the provision of financial support for
the nonviolent political, religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or beliefs of any person
or group.” SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 28 (2011).
91. Chesney, supra note 69, at 13.
92. Id. (quoting JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG & SERENA WILLE, MONOGRAPH ON
TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 31–32 (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/
staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVA9-F6MU]).
93. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 9.
94. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 101.
95. HERMAN, supra note 90, at 28.
96. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 101.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012); see also infra Part I.D (discussing the designation
of FTOs).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2339.
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
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Additionally, under § 2339B, “any financial institution that becomes aware
that it has possession of, or control over FTO funds must retain possession
of, or maintain control over, such funds, and report it to the Secretary.”100
The § 2339B statute centers on the belief that organizations that engage
in terrorist activities are “so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”101 The
provision is designed to criminalize all financial supporters of terrorists,
including those who fund terrorism in the guise of philanthropic and
charitable activities.102 It is the most frequently charged of the terrorist
financing statutes.103
Section 2339C is the primary and only terrorist financing statute that
addresses the collection of funds.104 It was enacted in 2001 as part of the
USA PATRIOT Act and implements the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.105 Section 2339C punishes the
provision or collection of funds “with the intention that such funds be used,
or with the knowledge that such funds are to be used, in full or in part, in
order to carry out” a statutorily enumerated predicate crime.106 The
predicate offenses are those prohibited under international law by a
counterterrorism treaty,107 or any act
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is
to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.108

“Provides” includes “giving, donating and transmitting,” and “collects,”
means both “raising and receiving funds.”109
Prosecutors rarely use § 2339C110 because it overlaps with §§ 2339A and
2339B, has limited jurisdictional reach compared to other terrorist financing
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2). Any financial institution that knowingly fails to comply is
subject to a civil penalty in an amount that is the greater of $50,000 per violation or twice the
amount of which the financial institution was required under subsection (a)(2) to retain
possession or control. Id.
101. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (emphasis added).
102. RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND THE RULE OF LAW 78 (2008).
103. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 9.
104. Id. at 11. Section 2339C also covers concealment, applying to a person who
“knowingly conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of any
material support or resources, or any funds or proceeds of such funds” if he or she knows or
intends that the support or resources are to be provided in violation of §§ 2339B or 2339C.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(c).
105. See JIMMY GURULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 318 n.157 (2009) (“Section 2339C was intended to implement the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which requires
signatories to prosecute or extradite individuals who contribute to, or collect money for,
terrorist groups.”).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a).
107. Id.; see also Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 11.
108. 18 U.S.C § 2339C(a)(1)(B).
109. Id. § 2339C(e)(3)–(4).
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crimes, and requires specific intent that the funds are used to “carry out” an
enumerated predicate act.111
D. Designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations
The practice of list making is integral to the material support and terrorist
financing laws.112 The United States publishes lists of designated persons
and groups that are determined to be terrorists.113 It becomes a crime to
engage in any financial transactions with a person or group on that list,
regardless of whether the financial transaction itself is designed to promote
acts of terrorism.114
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and
Secretary of the Treasury, designates FTOs for a two-year period under
§ 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.115 The designation is made
if the Secretary finds that the group is foreign, engages in or has the
capacity or intent to engage in terrorist activity, and threatens the security of
U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States.116
Several other lists also are relevant to terror financing enforcement. The
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) allows for
prosecution of persons who willfully engage in financial transactions with
persons and organizations that the President has determined to be a threat to
the United States.117 Under IEEPA authority, the Office of Foreign Assets
Controls (OFAC) creates the Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGT) and State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) lists.118 The SDGT list
includes all organizations on the State Department’s FTO list, plus more.119
Under the IEEPA, OFAC is authorized to freeze bank accounts and block
assets of entities appearing on the SDGT list, but it applies only to U.S.
individuals and financial institutions.120 OFAC also maintains a list called

110. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 11.
111. Id.
112. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3410.
113. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 101.
114. Id.
115. Id. FTO designations follow an exhaustive review process of information about a
group’s activity taken from classified and open sources. The State Department, working
with the Justice and Treasury Departments and the intelligence community, prepares a
detailed record of the terrorist activity of the proposed individual or group. The State
Department provides classified notification to Congress seven days before publishing an
FTO designation in the Federal Register. Id. at 101–02.
116. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012). The D.C. Circuit held that designated FTOs
may have a due process right to notice, disclosure of at least unclassified parts of the
administrative record underlying their designation, and an opportunity to be heard. See Nat’l
Council of Resistance v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A designated
organization has thirty days to obtain judicial review of the action from the D.C. Circuit. Id.
at 196. The court may overturn the action only if the Secretary acted unconstitutionally,
illegally, or arbitrarily. Id. at 199.
117. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
118. See Breinholt, supra note 18, at 102.
119. See id.
120. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3411.
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the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list, which
combines OFAC and State Department lists, including SSTs.121
E. IEEPA Violations
Terrorist financing cases occasionally include another criminal offense
under 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c). The statute criminalizes the willful violation of
an executive order or an implementing regulation issued pursuant to
IEEPA.122 Although IEEPA has extraterritorial reach, it is limited in
comparison to the jurisdictional reach of the material support statutes.123
F. International Money Laundering
In terrorist financing cases, prosecutors also sometimes include an
international money laundering charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2).124
The statute prohibits the transportation, transmission, or transfer of funds
from a place inside the United States to a place outside the United States
“with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity.”125 The list of unlawful activities is extensive; it includes the
material support offenses, IEEPA violations, and many other terrorismrelated crimes.126 Section 1956(a)(2) effectively criminalizes “reverse”
money laundering, or the movement of “clean” money overseas for an illicit
purpose.127
G. Prosecutorial Guidance for Terrorist Financing Cases
To fully understand the use of the material support and terrorist financing
statutes in ATA civil suits, it is useful to look at prosecutorial guidance in
this area. The U.S. Attorney’s Bulletin advises:
When considering how to charge a terrorist financing or facilitation case,
the first step is to determine the intended recipient of the material support
or resources. The basic question is: What terrorist or terrorist group is
involved? If the terrorist group is an FTO, prosecutors should consider a
§ 2339B charge. If the terrorist group is an SDGT (but perhaps not an
FTO, for example, the Taliban), consider IEEPA. If no FTO or SDGT is
involved, but the support was intended to help prepare for or carry out an
enumerated predicate offense, then look to § 2339A and/or § 2339C.
Finally, where there is evidence that the defendant sent, or attempted to

121. Id.
122. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c).
123. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 12. The Supreme Court has held that
to prove willful criminal conduct, the government must show that the defendant acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful; the government need not show that the defendant
knew precisely which law was being violated. Id.; see Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184,
191–97 (1998). This is considered a higher mens rea standard than the “knowing” standard
of § 2339B. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 12.
124. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 13.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2).
126. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 13.
127. Id.
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send, funds overseas, a charge of international money laundering may
also be appropriate.128

This prosecutorial guidance demonstrates the interplay between the
material support statutes and the IEEPA statutes, and it also highlights the
importance of the different designations discussed in Part I.D.
H. Hypothetical: A Look at the
Statutory Link to Liability
Victim A, a U.S. citizen, is killed during an overseas terrorist attack
perpetrated by FTO Z. Bank 1 provided financial services for FTO Z in the
days prior to the attack. Victim A’s estate decides to bring a civil claim
against Bank 1 under the ATA premised on the following statutory
incorporations129:
(1) Victim A’s estate brings the claim under § 2333(a) which provides a
civil cause of action for injuries suffered by reason of an act of
“international terrorism.” “International terrorism,” is defined by § 2331 as
“acts dangerous to human life” that are a violation of U.S. criminal laws
and “appear intended” “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.”
(2) Victim A argues that Bank 1’s provision of financial services to FTO
Z was an “act of international terrorism” as required by § 2333(a). Victim
A first alleges that FTO Z violated a U.S. criminal law (as required by
§ 2331): Victim A claims that, by providing financial services to an FTO,
Bank 1 violated § 2333A, § 2339B, or the terrorist financing statute,
§ 2339C. Then, Victim A argues that by committing these crimes, Bank 1
engaged in “acts dangerous to human life” that appeared intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, meeting § 2331’s definition of
“international terrorism” for § 2333(a) purposes.
(3) The last statutory link is § 2332(a), which punishes whoever kills a
U.S. national outside of the United States. Victim A argues that Bank 1
materially supported FTO Z, the terrorist group that killed a U.S. national,
Victim A, overseas, which thus satisfies the § 2332(a) requirement.
This “chain of incorporations” was specifically delineated by the Seventh
Circuit in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development130
(Boim III) for ATA claims against secondary actors:
By this chain of incorporations by reference ([§] 2333(a) to [§] 2331(1) to
[§] 2339A [or §§ 2339B or 2339C] to [§] 2332), we see that a donation to
a terrorist group that targets Americans outside the United States may
violate [§] 2333. Which makes good sense as a counterterrorism measure.
Damages are a less effective remedy against terrorists and their
organizations than against their financial angels.131

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra Part I.B–C.
549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Id. at 705.
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I. Proximate Cause Requirement
in Primary Liability Jurisdictions
To satisfy the proximate cause requirement in primary liability
jurisdictions, plaintiffs also must prove that the provision of financial
services was a “substantial factor” in the sequence of causation.132 “[T]here
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of” and “the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court.”133 Second, the injury must have
been “reasonably foreseeable” as a natural consequence of the bank’s
provision of financial services.134 This is a tough and exacting standard.135
J. Mental State Requirement Under the ATA
This section specifically addresses the second element of an ATA claim
and the inconsistent interpretation of the § 2333(a) state-of-mind
requirement. As discussed, the second element of an ATA claim requires
that, at a minimum, the defendant satisfy the mens rea requirement of the
predicate act qualifying as international terrorism.136
1. Terrorist Financing
and Material Support Mens Rea
To understand the conflict over the § 2333(a) mental state requirement, it
is important first to address the underlying criminal offenses. The material
support or terrorist financing statutes presumably will act as the predicate
offenses for banks. Each statute has its own mens rea requirement.
Sections 2339A and 2339C require proof of a heightened mens rea.137
To violate § 2339A, the defendant must provide material support or
resources “knowing or intending” that they are used to carry out acts of
terrorism.138 To violate § 2339C, the defendant must have provided or
collected funds with the specific intent or knowledge that the funds were to
be used to “carry out” enumerated predicate offenses related to terrorism.139
Currently, no case law interprets the § 2339C “carry out” language; it
remains an open question whether courts will find that it covers funds
132. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 185.
133. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations in original)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1975)).
134. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 203 n.125 (“Assuming plaintiff could demonstrate that
[Arab] Bank acted recklessly, it has not shown that his—an American’s—injuries were
reasonably foreseeable by [Arab] Bank as a result of the size and timing of funds transfers
put in issue by plaintiff.” (quoting Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542, 572
(E.D.N.Y. 2012))).
135. Id. at 203.
136. See supra Part I.B. The defendant must satisfy the first element of an ATA claim, an
act of international terrorism, by meeting the (A) predicate criminal offense, (B) “appear to
be intended,” and (C) international nexus requirements. See Gurulé, supra note 24, at 203.
137. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 196.
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (emphasis added).
139. See id. § 2339C (emphasis added).
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intended to support a terrorist group’s general operational infrastructure.140
Both statutes do not require specific intent to support the particular attacks
that injured the plaintiffs, but the defendants must know or intend that the
funds support terrorist acts.141
By contrast, to violate § 2339B, the defendant must only have knowledge
that the organization is a designated FTO or engages or has engaged in acts
of terrorism.142 The defendant is not required to know or intend that the
material support or resources would be used to carry out a violent crime.143
Instead of tracing money from the United States to its use in terrorist acts,
prosecutors must only establish that persons are engaged in financial
transactions with persons they know are acting on behalf of designated
terrorist groups and individuals.144 The accused need only agree to provide
funds to a terrorist organization and send a payment in furtherance of that
goal.145
Courts hold that the knowledge requirement of § 2339B may be satisfied
by evidence that a defendant acted with willful blindness regarding the
organization.146 In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,147 the
court found that a defendant must know that “the recipient of the material
support . . . is an organization that engages in terrorist acts, or the defendant
must be deliberately indifferent to whether or not the organization does
so.”148 That is, the “defendant knows there is a substantial probability that
the organization engage[s] in terrorism, but does not care.”149 Several
courts agree with this analysis.150
Although far-reaching, the § 2339B mens rea requirement has been
upheld against challenges alleging vagueness and violations of the First
Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech.151 In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,152 the U.S. Supreme Court resolved whether
§ 2339B requires proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent to
further the terrorist group’s illegal activities.153 It held that § 2339B only
requires knowledge of the terrorist group’s status as a foreign terrorist
140. Taxay, Schneider & Didow, supra note 86, at 11.
141. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 45, 47 (D.D.C. 2010).
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (emphasis added). “Engaged or engages in terrorist activity”
is defined in § 212(a)(3)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. For further discussion
on the requirements, see supra Part I.C.
143. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 191.
144. Breinholt, supra note 18, at 101.
145. Id.
146. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 196.
147. 740 F. Supp. 2d 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
148. Id. at 517.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonaiss, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 428 (E.D.N.Y.
2013); Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). These courts have
rejected arguments that “knowledge” in § 2339B for § 2333(a) claims requires plaintiffs to
show that the defendant intended the funds, financial services, or support to be used for
terrorist attacks. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 196.
151. See supra note 78.
152. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
153. Id.
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organization or participation in terrorist-related activities—not specific
intent for violent acts.154
2. Culpability Determinations in ATA Cases
To determine culpability under §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C, courts
look to the specific banking activities in each case. The type of services
that a bank provides may create a strong presumption of its mental state and
knowledge about the terrorist organization and its activities.155 Nonroutine
banking services, that is, those that are more unusual and specific, may
suggest that the bank knew that its services were aiding terrorists.156 Courts
look to a number of factors when considering a bank’s mental state,
including client interaction and the “knowing and intentional nature of the
[b]ank’s activities” in its provision of client services.157 Additionally, the
potential for liability based on routine services may turn on whether the
court recognizes aiding and abetting liability under the ATA.158
The Second Circuit, in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,
held that the link between the bank’s routine services and plaintiffs’ injuries
was too tenuous to afford relief, but the court left open the possibility of
whether some routine banking services might qualify to establish primary
liability.159
The presence of nonroutine services, on the other hand, may demonstrate
that the bank knew or intended that its services fund acts of terrorism.160
The court in Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC161 found that the defendant bank far
exceeded what is considered routine in its provision of services to terrorist
groups.162 Thirteen civil lawsuits were filed against Arab Bank in the
Eastern District of New York, between 2004 and 2011, by victims of
suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks linked to Hamas.163 The
plaintiffs alleged that the bank supported (1) Hamas, (2) charitable
organizations that funded Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and (3)
the Saudi Committee in Support of the Intifada Al Quds, and provided

154. “Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and
it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to
further the organization’s terrorist activities.” Id. at 11. In Weiss v. National Westminster
Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014), the court primarily relied on the Holder Court’s
analysis in assessing § 2333(a) mens rea requirements. See infra Part II.B.
155. Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3408–10.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
Evidence that a bank and a terrorist organization worked closely together to advance a
common scheme or plan may also satisfy the “appear to be intended” requirement for
proving a violation of the ATA. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 210.
158. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3408.
159. Id. This case was decided before secondary liability was uniformly rejected in the
Second Circuit. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 98 (2d Cir. 2013).
160. Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3409–10.
161. 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
162. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3409–10.
163. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 14, at 2.
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“martyr insurance” to families of suicide bombers, including Hamas
members.164
While Linde has been cited to support bank liability for involvement with
terrorist activities, it is unique for its facts.165 Arab Bank actively worked
with terrorist entities to process payments for suicide bombers; it was not
merely making transfers of funds in the ordinary course of providing
services. This behavior created a strong presumption of the bank’s
knowledge and intent to directly support terrorist activities.166 A jury found
the bank liable to plaintiffs in September 2014.167 To date, it is the first and
only bank held liable under the ATA.168
3. Section 2333(a) Mental State Requirement
Section 2333(a) is silent on the mental state required to trigger civil
liability.169 In passing the ATA, Congress intended to incorporate general
principles of tort law into the cause of action.170 It intentionally left it to
courts, “according to the common law tradition,” to define the contours of
the statute.171 In practice, the courts have been unable to resolve the
requisite mental state issue.172
Courts generally agree on several facets of civil claims under the ATA.
They uniformly hold that the ATA is not a strict liability statute.173 A bank
cannot be held liable solely because the money that funded a terrorist attack
passed through the bank during routine banking services.174 They also
agree that acting with mere negligence is insufficient to trigger liability.175
164. See Bitterly, supra note 29, at 3409.
165. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 19, § 9:43.
166. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Given
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the knowing and intentional nature of [Arab] Bank’s
activities, there is nothing ‘routine’ about the services the Bank is alleged to provide.”).
167. See Verdict Form, supra note 37.
168. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
169. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 195.
170. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“For
harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he or she: (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design with him or her, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct him- or
herself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and
his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.”).
171. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 195 (quoting Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474,
484 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 186; see Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 481–82, 505–06. The Seventh Circuit
emphasized this point: “To hold defendants liable for donating money without knowledge of
the donee’s intended criminal use of the funds would impose strict liability.” Boim v.
Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
174. See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012.
175. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 199. Negligent conduct does not satisfy the requirement of
knowledge or deliberate wrongdoing. Id. In Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief &
Development (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), the Seventh Circuit noted
that to impose liability, it would not be enough “that the average person or a reasonable
person would realize that the organization he was supporting was a terrorist organization, if
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Courts, however, remain divided on the requisite state of mind to sustain
a civil judgment.176 They are split on whether the statute requires proof of
a state of mind beyond that of the underlying offense qualifying as
international terrorism.177 “Defining practical boundaries [is] problematic,”
particularly in claims predicated on § 2339B, which does not contain the
heightened mental state requirements of §§ 2339A or 2339C.178 “Some
courts hold that the ATA requires proof of scienter. Under this view, a
bank is liable if the provision of financial services was conducted with
knowledge that the customer or beneficiary of the services engages in acts
of terrorism.”179 Others require that a bank also engage in “deliberate
wrongdoing.”180
Although plaintiffs may sustain an ATA claim by meeting the predicate
offense mens rea requirement, to find liability under § 2333(a), they must
still prove the third element: the injury of a U.S. national must be “by
reason of”181 a crime that constitutes an act of international terrorism.182
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE § 2333(a)
MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
This part examines the split between the Seventh and Second Circuits in
their attempts to clarify the mental state requirement of § 2333(a).
A. The Seventh Circuit and the Boim Line of Cases
In 1996, David Boim, a seventeen-year-old American and Israeli citizen,
was shot while waiting with his classmates at a bus stop near Jerusalem.183
Boim’s murder was later attributed to two alleged members of Hamas.184
In 2000, Boim’s parents filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois,
naming not only Amjad Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq Al-Sharif, the two men
allegedly responsible for Boim’s death, but also nonprofit organizations and

the actual defendant did not realize it.” Id. at 693. This would be insufficient to prove
knowledge or recklessness.
176. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 195. “The substance of such an action is not defined by the
statute, because the fact patterns giving rise to such suits will be as varied and numerous as
those found in the law of torts. This bill opens the courthouse door to victims of
international terrorism.” S. REP. No. 102-342, at 45 (1992); see also Boim I, 291 F.3d at
1011.
177. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 196.
178. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 19.
179. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 186.
180. Id. The mental state analysis is separate from the third element of an ATA claim,
“by reason of,” which also requires proximate cause to sustain a judgment. See supra note
38.
181. See supra Part I.I (discussing the proximate cause requirements for primary liability
jurisdictions).
182. Courts look to a number of factors in assessing the “by reason of” requirement,
including the time elapsed between the provision of services and the attack. See Rothstein v.
UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013).
183. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
184. Id.
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other individuals with alleged ties to Hamas.185 Two of the named
defendants were the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and the Quranic Literacy
Institute (QLI).186 The Boims alleged that the two organizations were the
main fronts for Hamas in the United States.187 Although the defendants
were charities, not banks, courts consistently cite the Boim line of cases in
banking cases.188
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim.189 The defendants argued that providing
financial services does not constitute an act of international terrorism.190
The Seventh Circuit authorized an interlocutory appeal and affirmed the
district court.191 The case then resumed in the district court, which granted
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to the liability of the three
defendants other than QLI.192 After damages were trebled and attorneys’
fees added, the jury entered a $52 million verdict against all the
defendants.193
The defendants appealed again, this time from a final judgment. On
appeal, the panel vacated the judgment and directed the district court to
redetermine liability.194 However, the plaintiffs petitioned the Seventh
Circuit for rehearing en banc. The court granted the plaintiffs’ petition to
“consider the elements of a suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 against financial
supporters of terrorism.”195
1. Boim v. Holy Land Foundation (Boim III)
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc and issued an
opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner.196 The court’s en banc opinion
addressed whether (1) § 2333 imposes primary, not secondary, liability on
donors and supporters of terrorism through a series of statutory
incorporations197 and (2) plaintiffs must satisfy the scienter requirements of
§ 2333(a) regardless of whether §§ 2339A, 2339B, or 2339C serve as the
predicate offense.198
The court emphasized that, because the ATA is a federal tort statute, the
traditional tort requirements of “fault, state of mind, causation and
185. Id. at 687–88.
186. Id. at 687.
187. Id. at 709.
188. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
189. See Boim v. Quranic Literary Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1021 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
190. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688.
191. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
192. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688.
193. Id.
194. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim II), 511 F.3d 707, 707 (7th
Cir. 2007).
195. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 689, 691–92 (“[S]tatutory silence on the subject of secondary liability
means there is none.”).
198. Id. at 692. (“18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, B, and C . . . do not require proof that the material
support resulted in an actual terrorist act, or . . . punish an attempt.”).
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foreseeability” must be established for liability. Judge Posner explained
that the structure of the ATA provides for “[p]rimary liability in the form of
material support to terrorism [with] the character of secondary liability,”
through which Congress “expressly imposed liability on a class of aiders
and abettors.”199 Because the primary violator is functionally “an aider and
abettor or other secondary actor,” ordinary tort requirements do not
apply.200 Instead, tort requirements for secondary actors are appropriate for
ATA claims.201
Applying this reasoning, Judge Posner specifically focused on the
automatic trebling of damages under the ATA—a punitive damages
provision.202 Because “something more than the mere commission of a tort
is always required for punitive damages,” when they apply “[t]here must be
circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or ‘malice,’ or a
fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious
and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be
called willful or wanton.”203 On this basis, to satisfy § 2333(a), there must
be proof of intentional misconduct or “deliberate wrongdoing” on the part
of the defendant in addition to “the state-of-mind requirements” of the
predicate criminal statutes upon which plaintiffs base their claims.204
Judge Posner went on to explain that to satisfy the mens rea requirement
for the predicate offense in § 2339B cases, a plaintiff must only show that
the defendant either “knows that the organization engage[d] in acts [of
terrorism] or is deliberately indifferent to whether it does or not, meaning
that one knows there is a substantial probability that the organization
engages in terrorism but one does not care.”205 It is insufficient to prove
that a reasonable person would have realized that the organization was a
terrorist group because “[t]hat would just be negligence.”206
In assessing culpability for the second requirement—proof of “deliberate
wrongdoing,”—Judge Posner likened giving “money to Hamas” to giving a
loaded gun to a child.207 Providing funds to a terrorist organization
“creat[es] a substantial risk of injury” and thus, is reckless and may
generate personal liability.208 To determine a defendant’s level of
knowledge, the court held that the fact finder should look to the risk: “The
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 692–93 (“The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past,
and to deter future, unlawful conduct.” (quoting Tex. Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981))).
203. Id. at 692 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 2 (5th ed. 1984)).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 693.
208. Id. (“[I]f the child shoots someone you will be liable to the victim.”). As the
Seventh Circuit recognizes, “an activity is reckless when the potential harm . . . is wildly
disproportionate to any benefits that the activity might be expected to confer.” United States
v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2007).
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greater the risk . . . the more obvious it will be to the risk taker, enabling the
trier of fact to infer the risk taker’s knowledge of the risk with greater
confidence.”209 The mental element required to fix liability, on a donor (or
any individual providing material support), is present if the donor or
supporter knows the character of the organization. From there, “[a]nyone
who knowingly contributes to [even] the nonviolent wing of an
organization that he knows to engage in terrorism is knowingly contributing
to the organization’s terrorist activities.”210 There is no “charity defense”
or defense based on intent to support only the humanitarian efforts of the
larger terrorist infrastructure.211 The court concluded that allowing “benign
intent” to be a defense would practically “eliminate donor liability except in
cases in which the donor was foolish enough to admit his true intent.”212
Without an expansive interpretation of the ATA, “[d]onor liability would be
eviscerated, and the statute would be a dead letter.”213
Thus, in addition to proving the mens rea for the predicate crime of
international terrorism, the Seventh Circuit requires plaintiffs to prove that
the defendant had knowledge that the provision of material support or funds
would assist the terrorist organization in committing a terrorist attack, or
knowledge that the consequences were “substantially certain” to result from
his risky conduct, and deliberately disregarded that fact.214 It is sufficient
to show that the defendant “knew the entity had been designated as a
terrorist organization and deliberately disregarded that fact while continuing
to provide financial services to the organization with knowledge that the
services would in all likelihood assist the organization in accomplishing its
violent goals.”215
2. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s
Mental State Standard
If an ATA claim is filed in Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs must satisfy two
scienter requirements for claims predicated on a violation of § 2339B216:
First, plaintiffs must prove the mens rea for the underlying statutory
violation (alleged act of international terrorism).217 This often involves a
claim that the bank provided financial services to an FTO in violation of
§ 2339B.218 Plaintiffs must prove that the bank had knowledge of the
terrorist group’s designation as an FTO or knowledge that the terrorist
organization engaged or engages in terrorist activity.219 Knowledge can be

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Boim III, 549 F.3d at 694.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 698–99.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Gurulé, supra note 24, at 198.
Id. (citing Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
See id. at 201.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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satisfied by deliberate indifference.220 Second, plaintiffs must also
demonstrate “deliberate wrongdoing” by the defendant. “Deliberate
wrongdoing” may be satisfied by proof of criminal recklessness—that “the
actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to
result from his act.”221 The defendant must know, intend, or recklessly
disregard, or it must be substantially certain, that the funds are being used to
finance acts of terrorism.222
For § 2339A or § 2339C claims, the deliberate wrongdoing requirement
is satisfied if the defendant meets the mens rea for the predicate crime; both
statutes already require that the defendant acted with the knowledge or
intent for funds to be used to support acts of terrorism.223
3. Two Dissents in Boim III
The dissenters in Boim III, Judges Ilana Rovner and Diane Wood, mainly
disagree with the majority opinion regarding cases in which donations only
indirectly benefit Hamas. The majority assumes liability even in cases of
indirect support.224
The dissents are useful in demonstrating the
shortcomings of current interpretations of the statute and the problematic
nature of the majority’s holding in Boim III.225
B. The Second Circuit’s
State-of-Mind Requirement for § 2333(a)
In Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC,226 the Second Circuit
clarified the state-of-mind requirement for § 2333(a) claims predicated on a
violation of § 2339B. The Second Circuit does not require a state of mind
beyond that required to prove a violation of the predicate criminal
offense.227 This differs from the standard required for plaintiffs filing ATA
claims in the Seventh Circuit following the en banc opinion in Boim III.
The plaintiffs in Weiss were approximately 200 U.S. victims (or their
estates, survivors, or heirs) of terrorist attacks launched in Israel by
Hamas.228 The plaintiffs claimed that National Westminster Bank
220. Some courts refer to this as willful blindness. See Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A.,
925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
221. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
222. Id.
223. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 198; see also supra Part I.J.1.
224. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 709 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]he majority relieves the plaintiffs of any obligation to demonstrate a causal link
between whatever support the defendants provided to Hamas and Hamas’s terrorist
activities.”); see also id. at 724 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The en
banc majority freely concedes that there are no limits at all to its rule, and that a donor who
gave funds to an organization affiliated with Hamas in 1995 might still be liable under
§ 2333 half a century later, in 2045.”).
225. See infra Part III.C (discussing the dissents’ criticisms, specifically relating to the
“incorporation” method for finding primary liability).
226. 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014).
227. See id. at 204.
228. Id.
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(“NatWest”) provided material support and resources to a terrorist
organization in violation of the ATA by maintaining bank accounts and
transferring funds for the Palestine Relief & Development Fund, also
known as Interpal, a purported charity.229 Interpal allegedly engaged in
“terrorist activity” by soliciting funds and otherwise providing support for
Hamas, a designated terrorist organization.230 The district court dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims on summary judgment, holding that the evidence
demonstrated that NatWest did not have the requisite scienter to sustain a
claim under the ATA.231
The Second Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Pierre N. Leval,
reversed and remanded the case.232 The court held that the district court
applied an incorrect standard for determining whether NatWest acted with
the requisite scienter for § 2333(a) liability predicated on a violation of
§ 2339B(a)(1).233 The district court had improperly focused on NatWest’s
lack of knowledge regarding the financing of specific terrorist acts, rather
than focusing on its knowledge of Interpal’s ties to Hamas, a designated
FTO.234
The court noted that “[w]hile § 2333(a) does not include a mental state
requirement on its face, it incorporates the knowledge requirement from
§ 2339B(a)(1).”235 Relying on Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,236 it
explained that § 2339B “prohibits the knowing provision of any material
support to terrorist organizations without regard to the types of activities
supported.”237 In reinstating the claims, the Second Circuit held that
liability may therefore be sustained where the defendant had knowledge
that, or exhibited deliberate indifference to whether, it provided material
support to a terrorist organization.238 Because Hamas is designated as an
FTO, to be liable, plaintiffs were required to show only “that NatWest had
actual knowledge that Interpal provided material support to Hamas,
or . . . deliberate indifference to whether Interpal provided material support
to Hamas.”239 Plaintiffs did not need to show that the defendants knew or
intended to support terrorist activities.240

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 100, 118 (E.D.N.Y.
2013), vacated and remanded, 768 F.3d 202.
232. See Weiss, 768 F.3d at 212.
233. See id. at 207–08.
234. Judge Dora Irizarry relied upon the scienter requirement initially set forth in her
Strauss decision, that “a plaintiff must show that a defendant: (i) had actual knowledge of
links to terrorism, or (ii) exhibited deliberate indifference to links of terrorism.” Weiss, 936
F. Supp. 2d at 114 (quoting Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 423–25
(E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
235. Weiss, 768 F.3d at 207.
236. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
237. Weiss, 768 F.3d at 207.
238. Id. at 208–09.
239. Id. at 205.
240. Id.
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The court additionally emphasized that a bank may not escape liability by
demonstrating that a foreign government had a benign view of a terrorist
organization.241 The fact that it was not illegal for NatWest to provide
financial services to Interpal under British law was no defense to
noncompliance with U.S. law, including the civil tort provision of the
ATA.242 This indicates that banks must be diligent about U.S. designations
to avoid liability.243
In short, the Second Circuit held that to sustain a claim under § 2333(a),
plaintiffs only have to prove § 2339B(a)(1)’s scienter requirement, which is
directly incorporated into § 2333(a).244 Plaintiffs must show that the bank
knew or was deliberately indifferent to whether it provided material support
to a terrorist organization, irrespective of whether the funds were intended
to support terrorist activities or facilitate the attack that injured plaintiffs.245
III. CLARIFYING THE § 2333(a) MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT
This part concludes that, as the statute stands, the Second Circuit best
interprets the mental state requirement for § 2333(a). Further, this part
suggests that Congress should amend the ATA to clarify the state-of-mind
requirement and impose a heightened culpability standard.
A. The Second Circuit’s Analysis Is Correct
Under the current statutory framework, the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of the § 2333(a) mens rea requirement should be adopted
universally.246 This is because courts continue to hold that the material
support statutes serve as predicate offenses that satisfy the international
terrorism requirement for § 2333(a) purposes.247
The material support and terrorist financing laws are criminal offenses,
carrying punishments that include the possibility of life in prison.248 The
ATA civil provision should not impose a higher mens rea standard than the
underlying criminal offense of “international terrorism.”249 Therefore, if
liability is predicated on a violation of § 2339B, courts should incorporate
the knowledge requirement from § 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the
knowing provision of material support of any form to an FTO, regardless of

241. Id. at 209.
242. Id. at 209–10.
243. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 14, at 5.
244. See Weiss, 768 F.3d at 207.
245. Id. at 208.
246. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 221.
247. See supra Part I.C. As precedent dictates, the Second Circuit’s reasoning is correct
on this basis. But see infra Part III.B. (discussing why this interpretation should be overruled
by statutory amendment).
248. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). The statute also proscribes attempts and
conspiracies. The maximum sentence of imprisonment for a violation of § 2339B is fifteen
years or, if death results, any term of years or life.
249. Gurulé, supra note 24, at 221.
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whether the defendant intended to support the FTO’s terrorist or
nonterrorist activities.250
If a violation of § 2333(a) is based on a violation of §§ 2339A or 2339C,
courts should incorporate the state-of-mind requirements of those
statutes.251 This, in turn, automatically incorporates the Seventh Circuit’s
intended result in Boim III; violations of §§ 2339A or 2339C satisfy the
deliberate wrongdoing standard because they already are conducted with
the knowledge or intent for funds to be used to support acts of terrorism.252
This provides dual objectives as the statute is currently understood. The
Second Circuit’s analysis provides for uniform application and also serves
counterterrorism objectives aimed at stopping the flow of material support
to terrorist groups. Some courts currently agree that through its structure,
the ATA creates primary liability (albeit, for secondary actors).253 Through
the material support laws, Congress has spoken to the seriousness of
engaging in even benign activities with terrorist organizations.254 It
consistently emphasizes the fungible nature of money and the importance of
preventing activities at every point along the causal chain.255 Although the
material support laws were enacted after the ATA, and there are doubts
about whether Congress envisioned the use of the material statutes this way,
§ 2333(a) nonetheless serves to deter financial support and give victims
significant civil recourse.256 If banks are diligent about the individuals and
organizations with whom they are doing business, and have sufficient
monitoring policies in place that reflect U.S. terrorism designations, they
may be able to avoid triggering liability.257
B. Congress Should Nonetheless Amend the ATA
The current application of the Antiterrorism Act nonetheless creates
numerous issues and widespread confusion. Congress should therefore
amend the ATA to address the problematic interpretation of the statute.258
There are several available causes of actions—theories including indirect
assistance that creates direct liability; aiding and abetting liability; tort
theories; international law claims; mixes of §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C;
and varying standards regarding necessary knowledge, intent, scienter,
Interpretations are inconsistent and often
nexus, and causation.259

250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See supra Parts I.C., II.A.
254. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 31 (2010).
255. Sant, supra note 68, at 534–36.
256. Id.
257. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 14, at 5.
258. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 19, § 9:39 (“No customer goes through the line and
ends up with her plate containing the exact same mix of items as any other customer. So it is
with the judicial decisions addressing civil liability for material support of terrorism. Each
one is different.”).
259. Id.
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significantly different from one another.260 For this reason, Congress
should amend the statute to clarify both the state-of-mind requirement and
the bases for primary or secondary liability.
By linking the civil suit provision of § 2333(a) with the material support
statutes, courts have dramatically expanded the scope of the ATA.261
Instead of limiting suits to actions against terrorists, courts are allowing
civil suits to be brought against those providing services.262 This has given
the ATA extreme, and perhaps unintended, breadth in practice.263
In reaching a proposed resolution, Congress and the courts should be
guided by two principles: “(1) the requirements for liability cannot be so
stringent as would leave loopholes for persons to easily evade its
proscriptions; and (2) the requirements cannot be so vague or demanding
that normal everyday functions such as doing business and giving to
charities creates liability for the unwary.”264
C. Too Much Liability?
As the statute and its application stand, the ATA may generate large civil
judgments disproportionate to the conduct upon which plaintiffs base their
claims.265 There are serious issues with holding that violations of the
material support statutes in the financial services context qualify as
“international terrorism” for ATA claims in the first place.266 Courts
generally have not questioned or engaged in a thorough analysis of this
shortcoming. By extending the ATA civil suit provision to cover donations,
the “Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision simply writes out of the statute its
requirement that the acts at issue be ‘violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life.’”267 Courts post-Boim III have adopted Posner’s statutory
incorporation analysis to find primary liability for nonterrorist actors,
holding that the provision of financial services are “acts dangerous to
human life” that satisfy the international terrorism requirement for
§ 2333(a) purposes.268 The courts take this analysis on its face without
considering the potentially flawed bases upon which it relies. The
expansive reading provided by the Boim Court, however, and since adopted
by other courts, serves to be more “results-oriented” than consistent with
the text of the statute. The requirement of violence, “acts dangerous to
human life,” is central to § 2333(a); it is meant to target the actors directly
responsible for acts of international terrorism.269
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The Seventh Circuit’s analogy, likening giving money to Hamas to
giving a child a gun, is strained.270 As noted by Geoffrey Sant, a loaded
gun, by its nature, is a dangerous instrumentality that must be handled
differently than money; it does not logically follow that providing routine
banking services is a similarly dangerous act to human life.271 The liability
analysis is akin to holding a bank liable for a death, caused by a gun,
purchased by a known murderer, with funds withdrawn from one of its
accounts at the bank.272 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that one
may be liable for the actions of another if one “knows that the other’s
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and [nevertheless] gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other.”273 “By contrast, as courts have
long recognized, ‘[t]he maintenance of a bank account and the receipt or
transfer of funds does not constitute substantial assistance’ to criminals who
happen to keep accounts at a bank.”274 The “substantial assistance”
reasoning has been discussed by the courts during a proximate cause
analysis under the ATA, rather than questioning whether the underlying
acts serve to meet the international terrorism requirement needed to trigger
the mental state and proximate cause analysis in the first place.275
Had Congress intended to extend the potential for massive liability
(including through an attenuated chain of multilayered incorporation, as
framed by the Boim decision) it would have.276 The Boim III interpretation
engages in gap filling that does not provide for coherent standards of
application. This is especially apparent in light of a number of federal
statutes that do provide for secondary liability through explicit aiding and
abetting provisions to hold third parties directly and civilly liable to
victims.277 One dissenting opinion in Boim III points out that this is
“judicial activism at its most plain.”278 To hold banks primarily liable for
acts of international terrorism, utilizing secondary liability tort
requirements, does not make practical sense and does not meet the plain
reading of the statute.279
Engaging in a state-of-mind analysis for banks for acts of international
terrorism is even harder to reconcile. Banks provide financial services for
270. See id. at 535 (“This definition has been stretched to reach financial transactions,
which, on their face, are neither ‘violent’ nor ‘dangerous.’ In fact, the entire basis for
describing banking transactions as ‘dangerous’ acts is nothing more than a single,
unsupported analogy in which financial transfers to terrorists are compared to giving a
loaded gun to a child.”).
271. Id. at 568.
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274. Sant, supra note 68, at 580 (alteration in original) (quoting Strauss v. Credit
Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006)).
275. See Gurulé, supra note 24, at 214–15.
276. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
181–82 (1994) (explaining that statutes that intend for secondary liability explicitly allow for
liability on the basis that a secondary actor aided and abetted an offense).
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profit—not to fund terrorism. Unless the financial institution directly
intends to support terrorist activities, as in Linde for example, it should not
be held primarily liable for attacks that are carried out by terrorist
organizations.280 This is attenuated and particularly troublesome when
analyzed through a state-of-mind analysis. Liability currently rests on the
following premise: the bank knew, intended, or recklessly disregarded,
during the provision of basic banking services, carried out in the ordinary
course of business, that funds were being provided to terrorist organizations
(or through charities or individuals that support terrorist organizations) that
engage in acts of terrorism and substantially assisted and caused a terrorist
attack for which it should be held directly liable.281
Because the holdings of post-Boim courts have generally applied this
flawed framework, Congress should act to remedy the infirmities of
interpreting the statute this way. Congress ultimately has a duty to ensure
that § 2333(a) is applied uniformly. However, the current application of
§ 2333(a) is resulting in disparate treatment under the statute, and
defendants face potentially bankrupting civil judgments on an attenuated
basis of liability and causation that is inconsistent with the text of the
statute.282
CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional split on the § 2333(a) state-of-mind requirement
creates several problems. Because the Seventh Circuit requires proof of a
heightened mental state to support a claim under the ATA, plaintiffs have
incentive to forum shop. It will be easier to obtain a favorable judgment in
jurisdictions where the plaintiffs must only prove the mens rea required to
establish a material support violation.283 The split on the § 2333(a) mental
state requirement will lead to inconsistent, and potentially disparate, civil
judgments depending on the place of filing. In the Second Circuit, a
defendant may be liable for violating § 2333(a) for knowingly providing
financial services to a designated FTO.284 The same defendant would not
be found liable in a jurisdiction where a plaintiff also had to demonstrate
that the defendant acted with knowledge or intention, or with reckless
disregard that the funds were to be used to facilitate or finance a terrorist
attack.285
While the Second Circuit’s standard best interprets the statute as it is
currently applied, the current ATA framework exposes secondary actors to
disproportionate judgments for acts of international terror. To remedy the
issue, Congress should clarify the requisite § 2333(a) mental state, and it
should amend the ATA to allow for primary liability only when a bank acts
with heightened culpability in its provision of financial services to terrorist
280.
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organizations. Unless Congress adopts liability for secondary actors
through an explicit aiding and abetting provision, banks should not be
subject to primary liability for the provision of financial services unless
such provision is done with the knowledge or intent that the funds are used
to finance acts of terrorism.

